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Articles
TAX-EXEMPT BOND FINANCING OF SPORTS STADIUMS:
IS THE PRICE RIGHT?
ANOOP K BHASIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States places great importance on professional
sports. Fans, their teams, their sports heroes and their team loyal-
ties have stood the test of time. Professional sports are an obsession
of Americans and fans all over the world.
The economics of professional sports forces owners to obtain
the best players and stadium deals for their money. Thus, no
longer do sports team owners look for simple operational stadium
leases that would allow them to play on "any old field," private sta-
dium or municipal stadium. Instead owners are seeking to build
new state of the art stadiums. There are many substantial and com-
plex financial components to building these sports stadiums. The
Internal Revenue Code ("Code") and its regulations add to this
complexity when tax-exempt bonds are used to finance sports
stadiums.
This Article proposes a middle-ground legislative approach,
which is designed to preserve states' and political subdivisions' fed-
eral subsidy for tax-exempt bond financing when building new
sports stadiums. Publicly financed sports stadiums provide profes-
sional sports teams with a competitive economic advantage in the
sports industry by giving them the ability to offer a high quality/
high cost product to the sports-crazed public. In a free and open
market, the public feeds the demand for professional sports.
Section II of this Article provides a background of tax-exempt
bond financing for sports stadiums and the basics of tax-exempt
bond financing within the intricate statutory framework of the
Code.1 Section III considers the congressional threat to curb or
* Member, DeCotiis, Fitzpatrick, Gluck, Hayden & Cole, LLP, N.J.; former
General Counsel to the West Virginia State Treasurer. University of Notre Dame,
B.B.A. FIN; West Virginia University College of Law, J.D.; Villanova University
School of Law, L.L.M. in Tax.
1. For a background discussion of tax-exempt bond financing, see infra notes
5-58 and accompanying text.
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eliminate the federal subsidy carved out for tax-exempt bond fi-
nancing.2 Section IV addresses the public and private sectors' op-
position toward congressional attempts to eliminate the federal tax-
exempt bond subsidy used to finance sports stadiums.3 Section V of
the Article provides a middle-ground legislative approach that
meets the federal government's true agenda and permits states and
political subdivisions to continue to finance sports stadiums using
tax-exempt bonds.4
II. TAx-EXEMPT BOND FINANCING
A. Background
States and political subdivisions have emphasized the use of
tax-exempt industrial development bonds either as general obliga-
tion bonds or revenue bonds to finance sports stadiums. A general
obligation bond ties the payments of principal and interest to the
taxing power of the state or political subdivision issuing such bonds.
A revenue bond ties the payments of principal and interest to a
particular revenue stream generated from the facility being built.
This revenue is typically generated by a dedicated tax, but it may
come from some other source. A revenue bond works to limit ef-
fectively the payment obligation on bonds to a specific dedicated
revenue source.
The beginning of tax-exempt bond regulation appeared in the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
and Trust Co.,5 which held that the federal government has the au-
thority to permit tax-exempt bond issuance by states and political
subdivisions to finance municipal projects, such as housing and
water projects.6 Many years later, in South Carolina v. Baker,7 the
Supreme Court clarified that the federal government has the au-
thority to regulate states in the area of tax-exempt bonds.
Prior to 1984, states and political subdivisions financed multi-
million dollar sports stadiums by issuing tax-exempt debt that was
2. For a discussion of congressional threats to curb or eliminate the federal
subsidy, see infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of such public and private opposition, see infra notes 78-
114 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of a middle ground legislative approach, see infra note 115
and accompanying text.
5. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
6. See id. at 585-89 (noting necessity and propriety of raising revenue by indi-
rect taxation and upholding constitutionality of Tenth Amendment claim).
7. 485 U.S. 505, 515 (1988) (upholding constitutionality of Tenth Amend-
ment claim).
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attractive to investors. The resulting growth in the issuance of in-
dustrial development tax-exempt bonds to finance sports stadiums
led Congress to conclude that the federal subsidy, via tax-exempt
bonds, was reducing revenue that would otherwise flow into the
federal coffers. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 ("1984 Act") was
Congress' attempt to slow the issuance of tax-exempt industrial de-
velopment bonds used for building sports stadiums.8 However,
Congress ignored the benefits of industrial development bonds
used to redevelop urban areas and to promote projects with a pub-
lic benefit. Congress' regulatory efforts were aimed at two Code
provisions for tax-exempt bond financing of sports stadiums.
First, the 1984 Act capped section 146 of the Code for tax-ex-
empt industrial development bond issuance with a state by state vol-
ume limitation.9 This affected the volume of qualified private
activity bonds. Qualified private activity bonds are bonds issued for
a private purpose or to a facility that the government has an interest
in subsidizing. 10 The Code did not prohibit the issuance of tax-
exempt bonds for sports stadiums because the private purpose was
still a qualified use for private activity bonds. The result of this
Code change was a volume issuance limitation for states or political
subdivisions. Larger states and political subdivisions were relatively
less affected by the limitation than were smaller subdivisions.
Second, the 1984 Act prohibited in section 141 of the Code the
use of bond proceeds to acquire land, currently used properties,
and other facilities." Thus, states and political subdivisions typi-
cally had to purchase the land through eminent domain proceed-
ings. This, again, increased the financing costs to states and
political subdivisions. Additionally, the prohibition was meant to
prevent using bond proceeds to build luxury boxes and health facil-
ities at stadiums. 12 As a result, none of the bond proceeds could
finance any extras in sports stadiums. This measure also increased
the cost of sports stadiums to states and political subdivisions. Con-
gress' intent behind both Code amendments was to increase reve-
nues to the federal coffers by~t~ the use of ta-~xempt bonds
8. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369 § 41, 98 Stat. 494
(1984).
9. See I.R.C. § 146(b) (1) (1988 & Supp. 2000) (setting cap at fifty percent of
state ceiling for that year).
10. See id. § 141(b) (1) (1988 & Supp. 2000) (meeting private business test,
private security or payment test, or private loan financing test).
11. See id.
12. See John D. Finerty, Jr., Comment, Subverting the Internal Revenue Code in the
"GAME" of Sports Stadium Financing 1 MRQ. SPORTS L.J. 301, 308 (1991).
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to finance sports stadiums.13 Thus, the federal government
targeted the federal subsidy of tax-exempt bond financing to build
sports stadiums as a potential abuse of tax-exempt bonds and as a
federal revenue raising measure.
Undaunted, Congress continued targeting tax-exempt bonds
issued for sports stadium financing. Specifically, United States Sen-
ator Moynihan of New York opposed the largely private use and
private interests involved in financing sports stadiums, the loss of
revenue to the federal coffers and the increased competition
among states and political subdivisions to have professional sports
teams in their communities.1 4
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("1986 Act") intended to elimi-
nate sports stadium tax-exempt bond issuance by removing sports
stadiums from the Code's exempt facilities list to have a qualified
private activity bond.15 The net effect was that private activity bonds
could no longer be issued for sports stadiums, and tax-exempt in-
dustrial development bonds had to meet the newly increased public
use requirements.1 6 The 1986 Act targeted tax-exempt industrial
development bonds by denying certain private use purposes unless
a public use/public benefit was established for the bond issue.1 7 In
restricting tax-exempt bonds, Congress was under a misguided con-
ception regarding who would receive the benefits from sports stadi-
ums: the professional sports teams, states or political subdivisions,
or communities.18 In fact, these changes to the Code had the unin-
tended effect of increasing tax-exempt bond issuance for building
sports stadiums. The uncertainties surrounding the Code changes
rushed many sports stadium bond issues to the market, and many
bond issues were grandfathered under the previous Code
provisions. 19
Despite the proliferation of case law against the proposition
and numerous amendments to the Code, the use of tax-exempt
13. See id. at 305-08.
14. 142 CONG. REC. S6306 (June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
15. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (ex-
plaining bond basics and private activity bonds). For a detailed explanation of
bond basics and private activity bonds, see infra notes 24-46 and accompanying
text.
16. For a discussion of these effects, see infra notes 24-46 and accompanying
text.
17. See I.R.C. § 141 (d) (1) (1988 & Supp. 2000).
18. See Finerty, supra note 12, at 305-08.
19. See Dennis Zimmerman, CRS Report For Congress, May 29, 1996, reprinted in
CRS Reports on Tax-Exempt Bonds Used to Finance Sports Stadiums, TAx NoTEs TODAY,
May 30, 1996. The 1986 Act grandfathered bond issues under the old Code provi-
sions so as to keep their tax-exempt status. See id.
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bonds to finance sports stadium projects remains a common occur-
rence. The targeted and burdensome restrictions on tax-exempt
bond financing did not stop the issuance of tax-exempt bonds to
finance sports stadiums.
A free market economy operates on an assumption of efficient
markets. Here the bond market adapted to the stringent Code and
regulatory requirements by developing new methods to finance
sports stadiums with tax-exempt bonds. After each adaptation the
federal government has continued tightening restrictions on tax-
exempt bond financing for sports stadiums to end what it sees as
subsidized private use of tax-exempt funds.
The federal government's determination is evident in pro-
posed legislation that plainly eliminates the use of federal tax-ex-
empt bonds to build sports stadiums. Senator Moynihan called tax-
exempt bond financing of sports stadiums an unintended federal
tax subsidy. 20 An understanding of the current Code prescribes a
process for tax-exempt bond projects that provides use restrictions,
mandates qualifying tests and barely permits financing of sports sta-
diums using tax-exempt bonds. However, in most instances the
Code is so problematic that alternative financing methods are
utilized.
B. The Tax-Exempt Bond Financing Process
Tax-exempt bond financing for a sports stadium resembles the
construction process of a large real estate development project.
Most parties in a tax-exempt bond financing of a sports stadium
attempt to protect their interests and capital while meeting strin-
gent Code and regulation requirements. 21 Like any real estate pro-
ject, building a sports stadium requires several pre-acquisition steps.
The first step is a site study, which includes site analysis, zoning re-
quirements, environmental impact, community impact, transporta-
tion and highway access analysis, parking options, suitability of the
locale to prospective tenants and other factors. 22 The pre-acquisi-
tion costs are not charged to the bond issue but rather are a direct
cost paid and subsidized by states and political subdivisions.
The next step is allocating ownership and control of the sports
stadium, its design, its construction and its operation. This involves
20. For a discussion of Moynihan's views on this issue, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
21. See Finerty, supra note 12, at 302-06 (discussing oratory of deal).
22. See id. at 303 (citing J. BAGBY, REAL ESTATE FINANCING DESK BoOK 84-92
(1980)).
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either direct acquisition of land or utilization of ground leases, final
architectural specifications, surveys, discussion of naming rights
and property title searches. 23
The last stage involves compiling financial data, leasing infor-
mation and contracting for management and maintenance of the
sports stadium. Additionally, this stage involves completing the fi-
nancing, building the stadium, operating the stadium, making the
debt service payments on the tax-exempt bonds and meeting use
requirements. Thus, the Code governs every aspect of tax-exempt
bond issuance.
C. Tax-Exempt Bond Basics
The Code drives the tax-exempt bond industry. Section 103 of
the Code states that gross income does not include interest on any
state or political subdivision bond, except for a private activity bond
that is not a qualified bond.2 4 This tax-exemption only extends to
qualified private activity bonds.
A private activity bond is a bond that primarily funds or fi-
nances services for a private or non-governmental individual. A
bond that does not fit the requirements of a qualified private activ-
ity bond will not be tax-exempt under section 103 of the Code.25 A
qualified private activity bond meets the Code's usage requirements
for a qualified facility. Section 141 of the Code specifies that a qual-
ified facility is deemed worthy of a federal tax subsidy regardless of
the facility's private usage. 26 Sports stadiums are not qualified facil-
ities.27 Thus, tax-exempt bonds used to build a sports stadium must
avoid classification as a private activity bond.28
A private activity bond meets either: (1) (a) the private business
use test and (b) the private/security payment test; or (2) the private
loan financing test.29
1. Private Business Use Test
Under the first prong of the private activity bond test, a tax-
exempt bond meets the private business use test "if more than ten
23. See id.
24. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (1988 & Supp. 2000).
25. See id. § 103(b) (1) (1988 & Supp. 2000).
26. See id. § 141 (1988 & Supp. 2000).
27. See id. The 1986 Act removed sports stadiums from the list of exempt
facilities that qualify for private activity bond status. Id.
28. See DanielJ. Lathrope, Federal Tax Policy, Tax Subsidies, and the Financing of
Professional Sports Facilities, 38 S. TEX. L. R1Ev. 1147, 1156 (1997).
29. See I.R.C. § 141 (a) (1) & (2) (1988 & Supp. 2000) (defining private activity
bond).
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percent of the proceeds of the issue are to be used for any private
business use." 30 Private business use is defined as any "use (directly
or indirectly) in a trade or business carried on by any person other
than a governmental unit," not use by a member of the general
public.3' Private business use results from private use activities pur-
suant to a lease, management contract, incentive payment contract
or other such output arrangement contract in a facility financed by
tax-exempt bonds. 32
Generally, temporary or incidental use by non-governmental
entities will be disregarded for the purposes of the private business
use test.33 A qualified management contract, providing reasonable
compensation for services rendered and not tied to a share of net
profits from the sports stadium operations, will not give rise to a
private business use.3 4 However, normal use by a professional
sports team usually will be greater than ten percent of the bond
proceeds, which violates the private business use test. Therefore
the first prong, being a conjunctive test, is met by not violating the
second part, the private security/payment test.
2. Private Security/Payment Test
Under the second part of the first prong, the private security/
payment test is met
[I]f the payment of principal of, or interest on, more than
10 [sic] percent of the proceeds of a bond issue is directly
or indirectly-(A) (i) secured by any interest in the property
used or (ii) payments in respect of such property or (B)
derived from payments in respect of such property, or bor-
rowed money, used or to be used in a private business
use.
3 5
Thus, tax-exempt bonds that finance a sports stadium must not
have principal and interest payments tied to the facility's private use
(payments secured by the facility, its rents or derived from its rents)
tha a~on to mr Lhan tenu pecentuu. T 1e CodeL. muanduates that a
30. Id. § 141 (b) (1) (1988 & Supp. 2000) (defining criteria for private business
use test).
31. Id. § 141(b)(6) (A) (1988 & Supp. 2000).
32. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.141-3(b) (2000).
33. See id.
34. See Jeanette Bond & William L. Henn, The Basic Rules for Tax Exempt Fi-
nancing, in TAX LAw AND PRACTICE 1995, at 97-100 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning
Course, Handbook Series No. 365, 1995).
35. I.R.C. § 141 (b) (2) (A) & (B) (1988 & Supp. 2000).
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state or political subdivision using tax-exempt bonds to finance a
sports stadium must have another source of revenue to fund ninety
percent of the payments on the stadium. This federal government
mandate has been a financial burden on states and political
subdivisions.
Further, the ten percent rule adds to the states' and political
subdivisions' financial burden by requiring favorable rental terms
to the sports teams in order to meet the ten percent threshold. 36
The regulatory structure for tax-exempt bond financing of sports
stadiums allows a state or political subdivision to receive only ten
percent of the revenue generated by the sports stadium, which
places the state or subdivision in a tough financial position. Build-
ing a sports stadium necessitates that other sources of funding be
used to pay the debt service on the bonds. For example, some
states and political subdivisions use lottery revenues, taxes, and now
even the states' tobacco litigation settlement funds to fund the pay-
ments on tax-exempt bonds for a sports stadium. 37 States and polit-
ical subdivisions must deal constantly with a scarcity of resources
due to the federal government's mandates.
The discounted rent required by the Code is a part of the sub-
sidy provided by political subdivisions, states and the federal gov-
ernment to professional sports teams.38 If a bond issue exceeds the
private business use test threshold but does not exceed the private
security or payment test, then the first prong is not met. This is
favorable because the bond issue will not be classified as a private
activity bond. Tax-exempt bonds that do not meet the private activ-
ity tests are the bonds used to finance sports stadiums. Because
they do not meet the test, these bonds fall outside the 1986 Act's
volume cap limitations set for private activity bonds. 39
3. Private Loan Financing Test
The second prong of the private activity bond test is the private
loan financing test. This test is met, "if the amount of the proceeds
of the issue which are to be used (directly or indirectly) to make or
finance loans (other than loans described in paragraph (2)) to per-
sons other than governmental units exceeds the lesser of (A) five
percent of such proceeds, or (B) $ 5,000,000."'40 This test is more
36. See Lathrope, supra note 28, at 1156-58.
37. See Daniel Kruger, Issuers Faced With Complex Choices for Tobacco Money, THE
BOND BUYER, Mar. 13, 2000, at 4.
38. See Lathrope, supra note 28, at 1158-59.
39. See I.R.C. § 146(a) (1988 & Supp. 2000).
40. Id. § 141 (c) (1) (A) & (B) (1988 & Supp. 2000).
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limited than the private business or private security/payment tests
of the first prong in that the direct or indirect loan must exist to
trigger the application of section 141 (c) of the Code.
A loan, in this context, is a subset of use. A public or private
use arises in every situation where there is a loan, but a loan does
not arise every time there is a public or private use.41 A loan can be
a direct lending of bond proceeds or the economic equivalent of a
loan. In other words, the private loan financing test will be met
through the substance of a loan and not formality. Meeting this
test causes a bond issue to be classified as a private activity bond.
However, a lease or other contractual agreement with respect
to a tax-exempt bond financed facility is not treated as a loan if tax
ownership is not transferred to a non-governmental person.42 If a
loan is not presented, in substance or form, in a tax-exempt bond
issue, this prong of the private activity bond tests is disregarded.
Typically the private loan financing test is not applicable for tax-
exempt bond financing of sports stadiums because the financing
methods avoid the use of loans.
4. Private Activity Bond Regulations
The private activity bond regulations impose a "reasonable ex-
pectations test" to the private activity bond tests. 43 At the bond issu-
ance date, issuers of a tax-exempt bond must take into account the
reasonable expectations about events and actions occurring over
the entire stated term of the bond issue. Under the regulations, a
tax-exempt bond issue that is reasonably expected to meet the pri-
vate activity bond tests is a private activity bond.44 However, an is-
suer who reasonably expects that post-issuance action will exceed
one of the private activity bond tests may disregard such action
when the issuer meets certain exceptions.45
The "reasonable expectations test" exception requirements are
met when:
(1) the issuer reasonably expects as of the issue date that
a property will be used for a government purpose fo-r
a substantial period before any non-qualifying act;
(2) the issuer is required to redeem all non-qualifying
bonds within 6 [sic] months of any non-qualifying act;
41. See Bond & Henn, supra note 34, at 26-29.
42. See C.F.R. § 1.141-5 (c) (2000).
43. See id. § 1-141-2 (d)(2) (2000).
44. See id. § 1.141-2 (c) (2000).
45. See id. § 1.141-2 (d)(2)(ii) (2000).
9
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(3) the issuer does not enter any arrangement with a non-
governmental person as of the issue date with respect
to the non-qualifying action; and
(4) the mandatory redemption meets the conditional re-
quirements for remedial action for post-issuance
acts.
46
The regulations provide flexible requirements so that a tax-exempt
bond will not be a private activity bond. Bonds that do not meet
the private activity bond tests or that fit the above exceptions are
used to finance sports stadiums.
D. Summary of Tax-Exempt Bond Financing Tests
A tax-exempt bond issue must not exceed the private security/
payment test's requirement that no more than ten percent of the
stadium debt be secured by the stadium or its revenues. Staying
within this requirement keeps a tax-exempt bond from being a pri-
vate activity bond.47 Tax-exempt bond issues are carefully struc-
tured so that the private security/payment test is not violated. As a
result, tax-exempt bond issuers and professional sports teams are
able to sidestep the private business use test - a test that is fre-
quently violated in this type of financing. 48
Congress' highly restrictive mandates in the Code and regula-
tions regarding tax-exempt bond financing for sports stadiums have
increased states' and political subdivisions' tax-exempt bond financ-
ing costs. Although Congress' true agenda was to reduce competi-
tion between states and political subdivisions, the Code and
regulations failed to meet this objective. Competition between
states and political subdivisions has increased, and even more in-
centives are provided to lure professional sports teams to a
community.
E. Alternative Financing, Incentives, Economics & Political
Reasons to Support the Sports Stadium Subsidy
Numerous methods exist to finance a sports stadium and to
maximize revenues from the stadium. One method to finance
sports stadiums is the traditional sale-leaseback plan, where the
46. William L. Gehrig, Fundamentals of Municipal Bond Law 1998: Federal Tax
Aspects of Municipal Bonds, 1998 NAT'L Assoc. OF BOND LAw. 100 (1998) (explain-
ing that even if private activity bond tests are met, satisfying all requirements will
still allow tax-exempt status).
47. See I.R.C. § 141(b) (1999).
48. See Gehrig, supra note 46, at 99.
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sports team builds a stadium and sells it to a state or political subdi-
vision while including a long-term stadium lease by the professional
sports team. 49 An incentive used with a sale-leaseback involves the
sale or lease of the stadium's name to a corporation. In Philadel-
phia, First Union Bank paid a hefty price to put its corporate name
on the sports stadium's marquee as the First Union Center, which is
home to the National Basketball Association's Philadelphia 76ers. 50
Corporations receive the benefit of their corporate name men-
tioned in all promotions for events at the stadium and during na-
tional television coverage of 76ers' games. This incentive generates
revenue for professional sports teams because the revenue is tied to
the professional sports team's private use.
Another method is to finance the stadium by using the revenue
from long-term leases of luxury boxes. 51 These luxury box seats re-
semble hotel rooms with plush seating, catered food and beverage
services, private facilities and private parking passes.52 The reve-
nues generated from such leases could generate a significant reve-
nue stream to cover construction costs or operating costs of sports
stadiums. 53 But, the use of luxury box seats is really an incentive
provided to professional sports teams because the funds are limited
by the ten percent rule to be used to pay the debt service on the
bonds. 54
Another method that allows a state or political subdivision to
raise revenue is raising taxes such as business and occupancy ("B &
0") taxes, hotel/motel surcharges, sales taxes, property taxes and
other taxes. States and political subdivisions also use lottery pro-
ceeds and funds won from the states' tobacco litigation to provide a
stream of income to fund ninety percent of the costs of a sports
stadium, the amount over and above the ten percent rule.
Financing methods of last resort are private financing options
such as taxable stadium bonds, bank loans and budget appropria-
49. See Kerry M. Fraas, "Bankers Up!" Professional Sports Facility Financing and
Other Opportunities for Bank Involvement in Lucrative Professional Sports, 3 N.C. BANK-
ING INST. 201. 213 (ADril 1999) (explainina that while this financing option is ben-
eficial to team by allowing team to avoid property tax, other parties involved are
exposed to substantial risk if team's revenues decrease or team defaults on lease).
50. See Stadium Naming Rights, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2000, at F10.
51. See Finerty, supra note 12, at 310 (discussing alternative financing options
for sports complexes).
52. See id. at 309-11 (describing amenities of luxury suites).
53. See id. at 310-11 (noting that luxury suites are leased for seven or ten years
and range in cost from $50,000 to $200,000).
54. See id. at 311 (noting impact on luxury suite financing from congressional
changes to Internal Revenue Code, which disallows previous tax deduction); see
also I.R.C. § 141(b) (1999).
11
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tions. Taxable bonds are avoided when there is a significant differ-
ence (greater than five percent) in the cost of issuing tax-exempt
bonds versus taxable bonds. Bank loans and budget appropriations
are part of the financing package provided by states and political
subdivisions to structure stadium deals and help raise capital to
cover their portion of construction costs and infrastructure im-
provements for the stadium site development.55
The tax-exempt bond financing of sports stadiums for profes-
sional sports teams is akin to a state or political subdivision provid-
ing tax breaks and incentives to lure new businesses and
corporations to its communities. 56 In each case, a professional
sports team or a business would look for the best deal to benefit its
bottom line.
States and political subdivisions are economically aware of the
intense competition for professional sports teams. The professional
sports teams launch their own "sports industry" within a community
and create jobs for sports networks, sportscasters, production com-
panies, statistic companies, technicians, retail jobs and hotel jobs.
Thus, the bottom line or economic reality for the states and politi-
cal subdivisions is the substantial economic benefits of having pro-
fessional sports teams, like any other large business or industry, in
their communities.
Political leaders are elected to represent their community's
wishes, provide government services, attract businesses to their
community and enhance the quality of life in their community.
This is part and parcel of what constitutes the public purpose doc-
trine.57 This doctrine explains what occurs when a community en-
trusts and empowers political leaders to enact laws to protect and
benefit those in the community. In a representative democracy,
such as the United States, the public should trust its government
officials to act in the best interests of the community and issue tax-
exempt bonds and spend the bond proceeds on sports stadiums
55. See Fraas, supra note 49, at 222 (using example of MCI Center in Washing-
ton, D.C., to show how bank loans are negotiated).
56. See id. at 208-11 (explaining that tax-free bonds may be issued if bonds are
not private activity bonds under I.R.C. § 103(a) & (b) (1994), which generally re-
quires municipality to back said bonds).
57. See Emeline C. Acton & Mary Helen Campbell, Public Funding of Sports
Stadiums and Other Recreational Facilities: Can the Deal be "Too Sweet"?, 27 STETSON L.
REV. 877, 884-91 (1998) (discussing creation and evolution of public purpose doc-
trine in Florida courts). The doctrine allows an incidental benefit to go to a pri-
vate entity as long as the project serves a primary public purpose. See id. at 884.
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that provide a public purpose or value.58 The proposed congres-
sional legislation, however, would eliminate the ability of a state or
a political subdivision to determine the appropriate projects to re-
ceive tax-exempt bond funds.
III. CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE FEDERAL TAx
SUBSIDY FOR SPORTS STADIUM FINANCING
A. Proposed Congressional Legislation
Some Senators have proposed legislative initiatives to address
the issue of sports teams relocations and to limit or end the federal
subsidies to professional sports teams associated with tax-exempt
bond financing. 59 Under a misguided conception, the federal gov-
ernment still seeks to end the competition among states and politi-
cal subdivisions for professional sports teams and seeks to increase
federal revenues by restricting tax-exempt bonds used to finance
private use sports stadiums. Two types of bills have been proposed
to meet the federal government's true agenda.
1. Relocation Bill
First, the relocation bill would establish criteria as to when a
professional sports team may move from one community to an-
other. The Team Relocation and Taxpayer Protection Act, pro-
posed by Senator Dewine, seeks to prevent teams from relocating
from one state or political subdivision to another, using incentives
offered from tax-exempt bonds by prohibiting the use of tax-ex-
empt bonds in this situation. 60 The bill intends to deny the federal
58. See Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1997). The court
held that issuing bonds to finance a new Tampa Bay Buccaneers stadium did not
violate the Florida Constitution because the project served a public purpose. See
id. at 674-75. Furthermore, the court stated that any member of the public who
was dissatisfied had a remedy at the ballot box. See id. at 679; see also Acton &
Campbell, supra note 57, at 878 (explaining competition between cities to attract
and retain sports teams and its effect on state government's use of public funds);
Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 896-98 (Pa. 1966) (holding that fund-
ing of sports stadium is legal because private business benefits are merely incideii-
tal to public's recreation and pleasure).
59. See Adam Safir, If You Build It They Will Come: The Politics of Financing Sports
Stadium Construction, 13J.L. & POL. 937, 955-63 (1997). In order to allow the NFL
to block team relocation, proposed bills would immunize the NFL from antitrust
liability. See id. at 955-60. Certain bills would also grant rights to the host city of a
team that wishes to relocate. See id. at 958-60. Other proposals would remove the
option of tax-exempt public bonds or disallow teams who are moving from benefit-
ing from such bonds. See id. at 960-62.
60. See S. 1529, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996) (preventing franchises from receiving
tax-exempt bonds for new location if they leave facility owned or financed by fed-
eral, state or local entity when in past year attendance of home games averaged at
13
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subsidy to teams that break lease agreements and move to other
communities. 61 The bill tries to regulate an end to the competition
between states and political subdivisions for professional sports
teams.
The relocation bill and other similarly drafted relocation bills
are questionable and remain stalled in Congress. Preventing states
and political subdivisions from using tax-exempt bonds as a financ-
ing method to lure teams away from one community to another will
not work. States and political subdivisions will still compete for pro-
fessional sports teams but with an added financial burden of using
taxable financing and local tax break schemes. States and political
subdivisions realize that there is real economic value and benefits
by having a professional sports team in their community.62
Additionally, the relocation bills seek to limit the leverage a
sports team may exert to pressure states and political subdivisions
into offering lucrative sports stadium deals in order to retain the
team's affiliation. 63 In fact, these types of relocation bills are a pro-
tectionist measure that flies in the face of the American ideal of
competitive markets, open markets and a free market economy.
The bills allow states and political subdivisions to use an existing
lease as a bargaining chip in relocation talks with professional
sports teams.64 The bills are questionable because the lease agree-
ment should provide remedies, or the state or political subdivision
is getting the basis of its negotiated bargain under the professional
sports teams lease agreement. Senator Dewine's bill would single
out professional sports teams, although there are other businesses
that receive tax incentives to relocate to a community that are not
penalized when they later decide to leave a community. This bill is
anti-competitive because the free movement of a business is re-
stricted beyond the bounds of any agreement negotiated between
states and political subdivisions and the professional sports teams.
least seventy-five percent of normal capacity, and within year of announcement of
their intention to leave, state or local government has voted for tax to finance new
or improved facility).
61. See Lathrope, supra note 28, at 1163-64 (explaining that bill denies federal
subsidies to franchises with existing leases who break their leases to move to an-
other city).
62. See id. at 1159-61 (stating that state and local economic benefits from pub-
licly owned sports complex are exaggerated).
63. See id. at 1162-65 (asserting that teams receive subsidies through coercive
bargaining with cities).
64. See id. (explaining that although DeWine-Glenn bill may limit relocations
of franchises, it does not decrease subsidies and allows subsidies to remain bargain-
ing chip between competing cities).
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2. The Tax Bill: The STADIA Legislation
The second type of bill is the proposed tax bill that eliminates
the federal tax subsidy of tax-exempt bond financing for sports
teams. Senator Moynihan's Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance
Act ("STADIA") legislation attempts to protect the taxpayer by end-
ing the unintended federal tax subsidy for tax-exempt bond financ-
ing of sports stadiums.65 Senator Moynihan contended that tax-
exempt bond financing of sports stadiums is inappropriate espe-
cially in situations where other cities lure professional teams away
from their current homes. 66 Senator Moynihan's STADIA legisla-
tion proposes to eliminate the federal subsidy for tax-exempt bond
financing by reclassifying such bonds as private activity bonds. 67
This reclassification would eliminate the use of tax-exempt bonds to
finance sports stadiums. 68 Thus, the proposed STADIA bill focuses
on the reclassifying of tax-exempt bonds to end an unintended sub-
sidy that the federal government alleges divides states, political sub-
divisions and communities through intense competition for
professional sports teams.
The Senator argued that the intent of the 1986 Act was not to
permit tax-exempt bond financing for sports stadiums, but to pro-
hibit such private use for tax-exempt bonds. 69 The Senator said
that professional sports teams, states and political subdivisions have
circumvented the law by using the unintended federal tax subsidy
to build large, unneeded sports stadiums. 70 Moynihan argued that
65. See 142 CONG. REc. S6306 (daily ed. June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (asserting that loophole created in 1986 legislation injures state and
local governments and limits subsidies available to people who need federal assis-
tance); see also 143 CONG. REc. S994-02 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Byrd) (supporting Senator Moynihan's bill by stating that offering tax-exempt
bonds to lucrative sports industry instead of benefits for nation, such as school-
books and safer roads, shows that "America has its values standing on their
heads").
66. See S. 224, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999) (as introduced by Sen. Moynihan on
Jan. 19, 1999) (reclassifying bond issues for professional sport facilities as private
activity bonds by making private security or payment tests inapplicable).
67, See id, For further discission of private activity bonds, see supra notes 24-
46 and accompanying text.
68. See I.R.C. § 141(e) (1999) (defining term "qualified bond").
69. See 142 CONG. REc. S6306 (daily ed. June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (explaining that Congress repealed private activity bonds intending
that stadiums no longer be financed with federally subsidized bonds).
70. See Andrew Gasper, Senator Moynihan's Field of Dreams: If You Build It, They
Will Come... But Not At the Federal Taxpayer's Expense, 17 VA. TAx REv. 341, 346-49
(1997) (discussing how in order to receive tax-exempt status for their stadium
bonds, cities were forced to structure their financing so that no more than ten
percent of debt was secured by revenues generated by stadium, its property and its
businesses). This structure causes the cost to be shifted to other sources or reve-
15
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bonds to build stadiums are a private use and should be private
activity bonds that are subject to the volume cap under section 146
of the Code. 71 The STADIA bill, in reality, ends the ability to use
tax-exempt bonds to finance sports stadiums because the sports sta-
diums would specifically be disqualified under requirements as pri-
vate activity bonds.72
The rationale for introducing STADIA is: (1) the federal gov-
ernment is losing tax revenue from tax-exempt bond financing of
sports stadiums; (2) states and political subdivisions are unfairly
forced to compete and provide tax-exempt bond financing to sports
teams due to the federal subsidy and when current stadiums are not
obsolete but merely increase revenues; (3) the 1986 Act meant to
end tax-exempt bond financing of sports stadiums, and STADIA is
only a corrective action to the original intent of the 1986 Act; and
(4) sports stadiums provide little economic benefit to states and po-
litical subdivisions. 73 Moynihan's rationale is significantly flawed.
Many key opponents to the STADIA legislation contend that the
proposed bill usurps states' and political subdivisions' spending
power and ability to control their spending of federal, state and
local monies.
Additionally, STADIA originally did not provide any phase-in
period for the prohibition of tax-exempt bond financing of sports
stadiums.7 4 The proposed legislation would have been effective
from its introduction in the Senate Finance Committee in 1997.
nue, such as taxes and lotteries. See id. at 347-48. By allowing the bonds to be tax-
exempt, the burden of payment also shifts to federal taxpayers. See id. at 348-49; see
also 142 CONG. REc. S6306 (daily ed.June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)
(arguing that only reason for building new stadiums and rebuilding existing stadi-
ums is to increase revenues for sports teams' owners).
71. See 142 CONG. REC. S6506 (daily ed. June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (arguing that stadiums should not be paid for by taxpayers).
72. See Milton S. Wakschlag, Handle with Care: Tax-Exempt Bonds Can Be Used to
Finance New Sports Arena for High-Profile Teams, But Only if Certain Strict Guidelines are
Followed, 6 INFRASTRUCTURE FIN. 11 (Sept. 1997) (explaining changes to be adopted
by STADIA in 1997 legislation and categories of governmental and private use for
bond status determinations); see also Amy B. Resnick & Craig T. Ferris, Reintroduced
Bill Would Ban Tax-Exempt Bonds for Stadiums, THE BOND BUYER, Jan. 21, 1999, at 5
(discussing changes in STADIA in 1999 legislation and importance of effective
date of legislation and grandfather clause).
73. See 142 CONG. REC. S6306 (daily ed. June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (arguing that factors that existed in 1986 and prompted Tax Reform
Act exist today); see also Gasper, supra note 70, at 350-53 (discussing Senator Moyni-
han's arguments for STADIA and how his proposed changes intend to provide
solution).
74. See id. (suggesting that effective date should be October 22, 1986 when
President Reagan signed Tax Reform Act of 1986 because that was when Congress
intended issue to be resolved).
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The bond market's industry officials and the public sector success-
fully argued that bond issues would be retroactively penalized. The
effective date was later amended to be effective from passage of the
proposed STADIA bill. 75
In reality, the federal government's "stormtrooper" mentality
borders on the tactics of a socialist banana republic, and govern-
mental officials must change their ways of dealing with perceived
industry problems. The proposed STADIA legislation offers no
middle-ground approach; it represents a federal government man-
date. The legislation has no support from state and political subdi-
visions, sports team owners or bond industry officials. 76
The STADIA legislation takes free and open market competi-
tion out of professional sports and singles out the sports industry
from other federally subsidized industries, such as family farms,
steel companies, sugar growers, etc. 77 Senator Moynihan's ratio-
nale may raise some valid concerns, but only when it is viewed in a
vacuum. The rationale is flawed in that it fails to consider the views
of the parties involved in tax-exempt bond financing of sports
stadiums.
IV. STOP THE STOP TAX-EXEMPT ARENA DEBT ISSUANCE ACT
A. The Flaws in the STADIA Rationale
1. The First Rationale
The first rationale for introducing STADIA is that the federal
government is losing tax revenue from tax-exempt bond financing
of sports stadiums. 78 This is simply not true from two perspectives.
The federal coffers could actually realize an increase in revenue. 79
Yet, any increase would be at the expense of the states and political
75. See Wakschlag, supra note 72, at 11 (stating that originally STADIA would
have been effective as soon as it was reported, but it was amended to be effective
when passed and signed into law).
76. See Safir, supra note 59, at 963 (noting how legislation provides relief to
taxpayers). However, legisiation places larger burdens on state gover'inllls, 1 ak-
ing it more difficult for sports team owners to receive funding for new facilities. See
id.
77. See Gasper, supra note 70, at 341-48 (noting that as result other programs
are being neglected).
78. See 142 CONG. REc. S6306 (daily ed. June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (reporting that from 1980 to 1985 annual amount of tax revenue lost
due to tax-exempt bonds rose 236 percent).
79. See Safir, supra note 59, at 961 (discussing how reclassifying bonds to fi-
nance sports facilities as private activity bonds would provide relief to federal tax-
payers but would require state and local governments to pay more in federal taxes
or produce more money up front for stadiums).
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subdivisions that would pay more federal taxes and bear greater fi-
nancing costs.8 0 States and political subdivisions would be forced to
issue taxable bonds or use other local tax schemes to finance sports
stadiums.81
The first problem is the elimination of the federal subsidy.
The federal government should instead limit states and political
subdivisions' issuance of tax-exempt bonds for sports stadiums.
This limitation would credit funds raised from tax-exempt bond fi-
nancing for sports stadiums against other federal funds received by
the state or political subdivision. State and political subdivisions re-
ceive federal funds to assist in the operation of programs, to pro-
vide financial assistance, and to provide for the operation of the
state or political subdivision itself.8 2 If a state or political subdivi-
sion takes advantage of the unintended federal subsidy, then it has
made an autonomous decision to allocate some of its federal funds
for the current year, and perhaps future years, to the endeavor of
building a sports stadium with tax-exempt bonds.83 This limitation
would force states and political subdivisions to evaluate carefully the
economic value and benefits of having a professional sports team.
The federal government should enact a mechanism to reduce
other federal transfers to the state or political subdivision that re-
ceives a federal tax subsidy from building a sports stadium. This
reduction could be based on standards the federal government cur-
rently uses to allocate its funds to states and political subdivisions.
The federal government standard for federal funding is based on a
state's or political subdivision's representative population and size.
The second perspective is that funds provided by the federal
subsidy do have a direct economic impact in a state or political sub-
division where a sports stadium is built. Senator Moynihan has
presented economic models and compared the investment in a
sports stadium to standard investments and concluded that the in-
vestment solely in the sports stadium resulted in economic loss.8 4
80. See id. (discussing heavier burden placed on local and state governments).
81. See id.
82. See David Burke, The Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act, 23 J. LEGIS.
149, 155-57 (1997) (noting that federal subsidies for construction of new facilities
is unwarranted).
83. See id. at 155-57 (explaining that although there is very vocal argument
against STADIA, loophole in existing law allows tax-exempt bonds to benefit ath-
letic franchises instead of traditional public purposes for which they were
intended).
84. See Gasper, supra note 70, at 360-64 (explaining that sports stadiums do
not increase revenues for city, revenues are merely shifted to area where stadium is
located, and any increase in revenues is enjoyed by franchise owner); see also
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But, Moynihan's economic models are flawed because their results
only account for the investment solely in a sports stadium and ex-
clude other factors.
Other economic factors must be analyzed for an accurate re-
flection of the effects of building sports stadiums with tax-exempt
bonds. The economic factors include: increased tourism dollars,
hotel occupancy taxes and surcharges, intangible prestige benefits
of having a sports team in a state or political subdivision, jobs cre-
ated directly in the sports industry and indirectly in other areas of
the community by the sports team and the stadium, increased chari-
table works by sports teams, increased food and beverage consump-
tion in the heart of a community, quality of life issues because
people and businesses choose to locate in cities with sports teams
and many other aspects, some quantifiable and other factors less
quantifiable.8 5 Some economists have likened the effect of build-
ing a sports stadium in state or political subdivision to that of ad-
ding a major department store or a small university to the economy
of the community.8 6 Economic reports have placed the impact of
Cincinnati's professional sports teams and stadiums at $245 million
annually to the community.8 7
Senator Moynihan may counter that sports stadiums represent
a waste of federal tax dollars to build unneeded facilities in states
and political subdivisions.8 8 Another Moynihan concern might be
that federal dollars spent on building sports stadiums represents
lost opportunity costs because the funds could be used elsewhere in
a community. His concerns have some validity, in that a sports sta-
dium may not be the best use of tax dollars. The greater concern,
however, is that the federal government should not decide what
projects are best for states and political subdivisions. Political lead-
ers of states and political subdivisions are entrusted with responsi-
bility, authority and power to tax and spend for their communities.
Lathrope, supra note 28, at 1153-55 (stating that economic experts have concluded
that constructing new publicly owned stadiums has negative economic impact).
85. See Gasper, supra note 70, at 360-67 (noting studies done by experts in
fieid when evaluating pros/cons of stadiums and their economic impact).
86. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Sports Facilities, Franchises, Events and the Ameri-
can Urban Renaissance, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 385, 386-87 (1999) (discussing economic
impact of franchise on its host-city and effect on fan/franchise relationship).
87. See Robert Taylor Bowling, Sports Aggravated: The Fan's Guide to the Franchise
Relocation Problem in Professional Sports, 28 STETSON L. REv. 645, 651-52 (1999) (stat-
ing that estimated gross annual revenues generated by sports teams from $30 mil-
lion to $75 million while in 1997 Stanford University had gross revenues of $1.5
billion).
88. For a discussion of the allocation of federal subsidies, see supra notes 55-
58 and accompanying text.
19
Bhasin: Tax-Exempt Bond Financing of Sports Stadiums: Is the Price Right
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
200 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Without the federal subsidy for sports stadiums, there is a dis-
tinct possibility that the federal government would be forced to in-
crease allocations of federal funds to states and political
subdivisions. The economic benefits derived from having the fed-
eral subsidy for a sports stadium are significant for states and politi-
cal subdivisions. The loss of these benefits would need to be
replaced either through attracting other businesses or receiving in-
creased federal government subsidies. The ability to use tax-ex-
empt bonds to finance sports stadiums is essential to attracting and
keeping professional sports teams and other businesses in a state or
political subdivision's community. The exhaustive list of economic
benefits seem to support maintaining some form of the federal sub-
sidy for tax-exempt bonds to build sports stadiums, especially be-
cause the economic effects are far reaching into a community.
2. The Second Rationale
The second rationale is that states and political subdivisions are
unfairly forced to provide tax-exempt bond financing to sports
teams because of the federal subsidy, even when current stadiums
are not obsolete, but merely to increase revenues for the owners.8 9
This too, is an incorrect analysis of the situation.
Currently, state and political subdivision leaders including:
(1) the Government Finance Officers Association
("GFOA");
(2) the U.S. Conference of Mayors;
(3) the National Association of Counties;
(4) the National Association of State Treasurers; and
(5) the National League of Cities,
have joined with sports team owners, investment banks, bond un-
derwriters and sports leagues to oppose the STADIA legislation.90
The GFOA is very concerned that the STADIA legislation usurps a
state or political subdivision's ability to borrow and finance its
projects and to manage its affairs. 91
89. See 142 CONG. REC. S6306 (daily ed. June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (stating that existing stadiums will continue to function for years to
come and that fans love historic stadiums).
90. See Burke, supra note 82, at 155-57 (noting that GFOA, investment banks,
bond underwriters sports leagues, Council of Mayors and League of Cities have
lobbied against bill); see also Gasper, supra note 70, at 353 (same).
91. Government Finance Officers Association, GFOA Fact Sheet: Sports Facilities
Bonds, in UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS & LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 1999,
at 401, 403 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Hand-
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If states and political subdivisions were being unfairly forced to
provide tax-exempt bond financing for sports stadiums, they would
unify in support of the STADIA legislation. Instead, they vehe-
mently oppose the STADIA bill because they recognize the value of
having sports teams in their communities.9 2 One example of a city
whose growth has boomed with new stadiums is Baltimore, which
constructed new stadiums for the Baltimore Ravens and Baltimore
Orioles.93 The National League of Cities issued the following state-
ment against STADIA,
The process of determining local priorities is difficult
enough without having millions of dollars of planning
work at the local level jeopardized by a single member of
Congress who has different priorities. If the entire Con-
gress and the President wish to debate this issue: fine, go
ahead. But to allow any one member to assert his or her
priorities over all citizens of a community and to throw out
hundreds of hours of planning and preparation for a com-
munity facility clearly permitted under existing federal law
is simply wrong.94
Additionally, communities would not elect politicians promoting
sports stadium legislation, and bondholders would not invest in a
state or political subdivision's sports stadium bonds if the project
was not viable and did not provide economic value to the commu-
nity and investment value to investors' bottom line.
Professional sports team owners want the increased revenue
generated by a new stadium with luxury boxes and amenities be-
cause of the high costs in professional sports.9 5 Owners are bur-
dened by stadiums that need numerous costly repairs and that no
longer meet their usage requirements. Stadiums, therefore, are not
being built merely to enhance professional sports team revenues. 96
Two contrasting examples exist in Pennsylvania.
book Series No. 549, 1999) (expressing concern that this legislation will also affect
financing for public and community oriented sports facilities).
92. See Latirope, supra note 28, at 1159.
93. See Shropshire, supra note 86, at 391 (stating that new stadiums have con-
tributed to "renaissance" in Baltimore).
94. Frank Shafroth, Moynihan Bill Set to Prevent Cities' Use of Tax Exempt Bonds:
Stadium Constructions May be Held up Nationwide, NATION'S CITIES WKLY., June 24,
1996, at 1.
95. See 142 CONG. REc. S6306 (daily ed. June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (stating importance of luxury boxes).
96. But see Shropshire, supra note 86, at 390 (arguing that owners' primary
motivation for relocation and new stadiums is increased profit); 142 CONG. REC.
S6306 (daily ed. June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
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The first example is the Spectrum in Philadelphia, an old
building in need of repairs. The Spectrum's seating capacity was
insufficient to meet the local demand for attending professional
sports events. The state responded by building an arena now
known as the First Union Center.97 The Spectrum is used for
smaller events and concerts, while the First Union Center is used
for the Philadelphia 76ers, the Philadelphia Flyers, large concerts
and other large crowd events. Philadelphia now has the best of
both worlds - the continued use of an old stadium and a brand new
stadium.
Pennsylvania is also in dire need of stadiums in Pittsburgh for
the Pirates and Steelers, and in Philadelphia for the Phillies and
Eagles because the existing stadiums are in horrible disrepair. 98
Pennsylvania officials fall into two categories. Those who are fis-
cally prudent are hesitant to build new sports stadiums that provide
a safe, comfortable and profitable environment for professional
teams. The fiscally conservative officials represent roadblocks to
building new professional sports stadiums. For the past five years,
the fiscally conservative officials have succeeded, as efforts to ap-
prove tax-exempt bond financing for building new stadiums in
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia have failed. Meanwhile, the teams
continue to be burdened by outdated, old and crumbling stadi-
ums.99 As public representatives, the officials have a responsibility
to provide public services such as sports, entertainment and recrea-
tion to their communities. If the federal government mandates the
STADIA legislation, the financial burdens facing the same govern-
ment officials who rely on Moynihan's unintended federal subsidy
would be unimaginably high.
3. The Third Rationale
The third rationale is that the 1986 Act meant to end tax-ex-
empt bond financing of sports stadiums, and STADIA legislation is
97. See Charles Mahtesian, Throwaway Stadium: The Fancy New Arena You Build
Today May be a White Elephant Before You Know It, GOvERNING, Jan. 2000, at 41-42.
98. See David Hoffman, Pennsylvania Governor to Veto Bill with Funds for Pitts-
burgh Stadiums, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 1, 1998, at 1.
99. See ANDREWJ. CARN, PHILADELPHIA STADIUM TIMELINE (Winter 2000) (not-
ing also that there is lack of public support for public financing and chosen loca-
tions for new stadiums); see also Hoffman, supra note 98, at 1 (explaining that
Governor Tom Ridge would veto legislation that allowed for bond sale to finance
new stadiums in Pittsburgh).
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only a corrective action to the original intent of the 1986 Act.100
Senator Moynihan believes that the corrective action of the STA-
DIA legislation should be enacted without debate or discourse. Ac-
cording to Moynihan, the 1986 Act's silence on sports stadiums as
exempt facilities is an implicit authorization to eliminate tax-ex-
empt bonds to build sports stadiums, as the stadiums become an
unintended federal subsidy. 10 1 This is a wrong and surprising result
from a political veteran like Moynihan, a man who has made a ca-
reer of bringing parties together to reach agreements and pass
good legislation. This third point is plainly punitive.
In 1997, Moynihan introduced the STADIA legislation but only
after New York's professional sports teams had completed tax-ex-
empt bond financing to repair and renovate their sports stadi-
ums.102 Curiously, after re-introducing the STADIA legislation in
2000, Moynihan announced his retirement from the Senate at the
end of the 2000 term. 10 3 It is no coincidence that in 2000, New
York would seek financing for new stadiums for the New York Mets
and Yankees. It seems that Moynihan had been catering to the po-
litical special interest groups in his New York district. The timing of
his legislative proposals were meant to prevent professional sports
teams outside of New York from obtaining any tax-exempt bond
financing for sports stadium projects. Perhaps Moynihan truly be-
lieved in his STADIA legislation and was tired of catering to the
whims and pressures of the New York sports teams owners and
other political supporters. Thus, the New York Senator, to appease
his own conscience and retain his integrity, chose to retire rather
than continue to be a puppet of his political supporters.
4. The Fourth Rationale
The fourth rationale that sports stadiums provide little eco-
nomic benefit to the states and political subdivisions is based on
economic data that fails to consider economic effects beyond the
100. See 142 CONG. REc. S6306 (daily ed. June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (explaining how new legislation will close loophole that allowed for
tax-exempt bonds).
101. See Kevin Green et al., Using Tax-Exempt Bonds to Finance Professional Sports
Stadiums, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Mar. 30, 1998.
102. See Burke, supra note 82, at 157 (noting that National League of Cities
was angered that cities in New York had just completed financing programs).
103. See Craig T. Ferris, Moynihan Plans to Retire, Sources Say, THE BOND BUYER,
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walls of the sports stadium. 10 4 As stated previously, Senator Moyni-
han's economic data looks only at the profitability and financial re-
sults of building a stadium. Analyzing this economic data in
isolation is not favorable to the operation and profitability of sports
stadiums.
Moynihan's economic data made two assumptions. First, it as-
sumed that a stadium has no benefits outside the walls of the sta-
dium. Second, it assumed the marginal tax rates of average
investors in tax-exempt securities would apply. The assumptions in
Moynihan's economic data overstate the effect supporting the elim-
ination of tax-exempt stadium bonds that in reality comprise a
small part of the tax-exempt issuance market. 10 5
Moynihan has sociologists jumping on his bandwagon. Based
on their visits and observations at numerous sports stadiums around
the country, two college sociology professors have asserted that
sports stadiums provide little economic benefit. A sociologist is de-
fined as one who studies the problems of society, and these two
professors started with a premise that sports stadiums are a problem
of society. While the sociology professors presumably had a good
time attending games all over the country, their conclusions are
flawed because they are based on mere observations and no empiri-
cal or economic data. 106
A more accurate reflection of the economic effects of sports
stadiums would consider other quantifiable economic factors. The
economic factors that look beyond the walls of a sports stadium are
what spur the building of new sports stadiums. For example, New
Orleans had many investors in the Louisiana Stadium and Exposi-
tion District as well as members of the Hotel Trade Association sup-
porting its sports stadium bonds because of projected increased
revenues and increased tourist tax collections.10 7
Professional sports teams enhance and increase private and
public consumption in states and political subdivisions, provide spil-
lover economic benefits to the community and appeal to a broad
cross section of citizens of varying socio-economic groups. The
benefits of professional sports teams and stadiums are transferred
104. See 142 CONG. REC. S6306 (daily ed. June 14, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (describing report finding no economic impact due to new stadiums).
105. See Green et al., supra note 101, at 2.
106. See Rick Eckstein & Kevin Delaney, Cities and the Stadiums Comparing
Downtowns of Baltimore, Cleveland and Denver with Philadelphia's is Misleading, PHILA-
DELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 16, 2000, at A19.
107. See Christopher McEntee &Jon McKenna, Arena Bonds Have the Strength
of the New Orleans' Hotel Trade Backing Them, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 10, 1998, at 24.
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to all local residents regardless of whether they attend games.10 8
Benefits derived from professional sports teams and stadiums are
similar to benefits received from a city zoo, public museum or pub-
lic golf course. 109 A sports stadium's economic benefits include in-
creased tourism, increased hotel occupancy, morejobs in the sports
industry and other areas, increased charitable donations and over-
all increased consumption in the particular state or political
subdivision.
Furthermore, states and political subdivisions along with the
private sector have joined to oppose the anti-sports stadium contin-
gent. Despite the increased burdens placed on states and political
subdivisions, they understand the economic value of building sports
stadiums using tax-exempt bonds as a primary method of financ-
ing.110 For example, Maryland's Governor Paris Glendening com-
mented on the move of the NFL's Cleveland Browns to Baltimore
(the Baltimore Ravens) that, "the addition of the Baltimore NFL
team and a sports stadium will bring excitement, enthusiasm, and
team spirit back to Baltimore, but more importantly it will have a
tremendous economic impact of approximately $132 million annu-
ally." 1  The Baltimore Ravens have become a football and eco-
nomic powerhouse as Superbowl XXXV Champions on January 28,
2001. Moreover, the sports industry creates professional and basic
jobs for people of varied economic and educational backgrounds.
Sports team and stadium related jobs include sportscasters, produc-
ers, technical positions, private businesses catering to the sports in-
dustry, seasonal employees. Even the local residents, who park cars
in their front yard for five dollars or more during home games,
benefit from the stadiums.112
Additionally, sports stadiums have value beyond pure eco-
nomic data. Many non-quantifiable factors support building profes-
sional sports stadiums. An example is the urban redevelopment
that occurred when stadiums were built in depressed urban areas in
Baltimore and Cleveland.11 3 States and political subdivisions realize
108. See Green et a]., supra note 101, at 5.
109. See id.
110. See Michael Stanton, Growing Number of Critics Fail to Still Nation's Stadium-
Building Mania, THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 10, 1998, at 46.
111. Joseph Spiers, Are Sports Teams Worth It?, FORTUNE, Jan. 15, 1996, at 29.
112. See, e.g., Mandy Rafool, A Report By the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures: "Fiscal Affairs: Playing the Stadium Game, "in UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS & LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 1997, at 375, 382-84 (PLI Patents, Copyright,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 549, 1997).
113. See id. at 383 (noting that due to downtown locations, stadiums in Balti-
more, Cleveland and Denver have aided urban redevelopment).
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that there are non-quantifiable benefits to having sports teams.
These factors range from increased community spirit, enhanced
loyalty of local residents and a draw or reason for the public to
come to a state or political subdivision and spend money during
evening or non-business hours.1 14 Non-quantifiable benefits can-
not be represented by a specific dollar figure or economic statistic,
but these benefits will accrue to a community over the course of a
stadium's lifetime.
Critics contend that the quantifiable economic benefits and
other non-quantifiable benefits provided by professional sports
teams do not have a significant impact on a community because the
dollars spent are dollars that people would spend anyway. Al-
though critics may have a point with an arguable dollar figure im-
pact, they fail to recognize that people may not spend
entertainment dollars in the particular community that would oth-
erwise receive these dollars by having a professional sports team
and stadium. In fact, the entertainment/tourism dollars would be
transferred to other communities that have sports entertainment.
Communities without such entertainment opportunities would
therefore lose the dollars or revenue from their community.
States and political subdivisions will continue to value the eco-
nomic benefits of having sports stadiums that are home to their
professional sports teams. The teams and stadiums provide states
and political subdivisions with a major league status that other com-
munities do not have. The price is right for states and political sub-
divisions that aggressively attract businesses and people to their
communities, and therefore they should oppose the STADLA
legislation.
B. Middle Ground Legislative Approach
First, the federal government's true agenda for enacting STA-
DIA legislation must be established. 11 5 Congressional leaders are
trying to eliminate the use of a federal subsidy for sports stadiums
because the federal government dislikes competition between states
and political subdivisions. Instead of eliminating an important fi-
nancing tool for states and political subdivisions, an alternative mid-
dle ground approach should be adopted. This approach regulates
and controls sports stadium financing and acknowledges the stadi-
ums' necessity in American society.
114. See Green et al., supra note 101, at 5.
115. See, e.g., Gasper, supra note 70.
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The middle ground approach is to create section 141A of the
Code to specify the requirements of qualified private activity bonds
used to finance sports stadiums. This new Code section would pro-
vide a fresh start for tax-exempt bonds to finance sports stadiums by
deleting all applicable Code references. Section 141A of the Code,
would contain all provisions relating to tax-exempt bond financing
for sports stadiums.
The new Code section would specifically allow sports stadium
bonds to qualify for tax-exemption as an exempt facility and place a
volume cap, similar to the Code section 146's volume cap, on sports
stadium bonds up to $250 million with annual inflation adjustment.
These actions would level the playing field from a federal perspec-
tive for wooing sports teams with extravagant stadium deals and also
cap any loss of federal tax revenue. Then, based on their commu-
nity's sentiments, states and political subdivisions could autono-
mously decide whether to sweeten their sports stadium deals. In
contrast, the proposed STADIA legislation does not address the
concerns raised from tax-exempt bond financing to build sports sta-
diums. The STADIA legislation limits competition and restricts
state sovereignty by eliminating the economic autonomy of states
and political subdivisions.
The bedrock of American society is the notion of free, open,
competitive and efficient markets. The middle ground legislation is
not anti-competitive and would not limit the ability of sports teams
to relocate. States and political subdivisions would be free to nego-
tiate stadium leases, contracts and options to keep a professional
sports team from relocating.
Finally, the middle ground legislation would remove the ten
percent requirement of the private payment/security test. The ten
percent rule prohibits more than ten percent of the rents received
from a sports stadium to fund the debt service on the tax-exempt
bonds. This rule burdens states and political subdivisions. Section
141A of the Code would permit a minimum of a fifty percent pay-
ment/security test. This fifty percent test would add greater secur-
ity to bondholders and decrease the financial burden on states and
political subdivisions to provide additional funds to cover ninety
percent of the debt service on tax-exempt bond for sports stadiums.
The middle ground approach sensibly permits fifty percent of rent
revenues on a sports stadium to cover debt service. Thus, the mid-
dle ground legislation meets the federal government's goals to re-
duce competition among states and political subdivisions for
professional sports teams, and it limits losses of any tax revenues
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from the federal coffers. The proposed section 141A of the Code
acknowledges that the private use/purpose of building sports stadi-
ums is a qualified use and that it provides quantifiable and non-
quantifiable economic benefits.
In fact, the proposed section permits the federal government
to regulate better the issuance of tax-exempt bonds for sports stadi-
ums and legitimizes an intended federal subsidy. Additionally, mid-
dle ground legislation relieves states and political subdivisions of
the onerous task of raising funds through lottery proceeds, in-
creased taxes or other sources to finance a sports stadium. Finally,
if the price is right for their communities, the middle ground legis-
lation reinforces autonomy of states and political subdivisions to
value appropriately and make financing decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The sports hungry public and our government officials must
reach a middle ground to provide tax-exempt bond financing of
sports stadiums and continue a much needed and used federal sub-
sidy for states and political subdivisions. Elimination of the federal
subsidy will not achieve the federal government's goal of decreasing
inter-city competition; in fact the STADIA legislation's elimination
of the subsidy would make the competition more intense and ex-
pensive. States and political subdivisions would be financially bur-
dened by the federal mandate eliminating tax-exempt bonds and
would use taxable bonds and other more expensive financing
methods.
The better approach is to legitimize the tax-exempt bonds per-
mitting sports stadium construction while regulating issuance of
any tax-exempt bonds to finance the construction. The proposed
middle-ground statutory framework curbs the federal government's
urges to control constantly all levels of government and would allow
states and political subdivisions to make necessary and appropriate
local financing decisions. Many states and political subdivisions rec-
ognize the economic value of having a major league status over
other communities. For these states and political subdivisions, the
final economic answer is that the price is right for tax-exempt
bonds to finance the building of sports stadiums.
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